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FOOD SUSTAINABILITY IN THE AGE OF COMPLEX,
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
Steph Tai*
Food production has become more complex over time.
Moreover, we are producing food in an increasingly global,
rather than local, manner. How can demands for sustainability
be reinforced in this age of complex, global supply chains? This
essay focuses on three key features of the modern food supply
chain: the variety of components, the complexity of the chain
itself, and diversity of “enforcement” mechanisms in food
production supply chains. These features suggest that traditional
governmental tools (such as command and control measures)
and contractual tools (such as performance standards) may not
be sufficient to ensure sustainable production methods.
Instead, I argue that sustainability advocates should focus
on identifying points within supply chain systems that they can
use to leverage greater accountability from the supply chain
actors with respect to sustainability. Drawing from Donella
Meadows’s insights into systems analysis, this essay argues that
such advocates should devote their efforts towards urging global
actors to incorporate traceability, transparency, and third-party
participation mechanisms into their supply chain contracts. It
uses various case studies to highlight how—when such
mechanisms have been incorporated—nongovernmental
organizations have been able to more effectively ensure the
sustainability considerations in supply chain governance. Thus,
by concentrating on such areas, rather than focusing solely on
traditional control measures, advocates will be more effective in
incorporating sustainability into food production processes.

*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. This essay is
dedicated to Professor Peter Appel, with whom I’ve had so many valuable and insightful
conversations about private environmental governance. He is very missed.
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I. OUR GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS
The past few decades have brought a dramatic increase in
the globalization of food production. In the United States alone,
“[a]s recently as the mid-1980s, U.S. agricultural exports and
imports were valued at less than $30 billion each. By 2012,
exports were worth about $135 billion, and imports were
approaching $105 billion, more than a threefold increase for
each.”1 These chains are lengthy, and often increasingly
lengthier as consumers demand more processed foods using
ingredients that are not seasonal to their locales. 2 Moreover, the
chains for food production have become increasingly complex,
with “the delivery of a single type of food to a consumer
involv[ing] many actors.”3
There are a number of features in global supply chains that
make them inherently difficult for an individual state actor to
regulate. Supply chains often contain a number of components:
from producers of farm inputs (such as seeds, fertilizers, and
pesticides), the farms themselves, “first-line handlers”
(including “for-profit commodity trading companies and farmer
cooperatives that aggregate the output of individual farms to
gain economies of scale and market access to the rest of the food
supply chain”), manufacturers, wholesalers, logistic firms who
do “not actually assume ownership of the food products but
[instead] provide the service of logistical distribution and
inventory coordination,” institutional buyers, retail food stores,
and food and beverage services. 4 When these chains are global,
these actors can be spread around the world, subject to differing
types and degrees of regulatory oversight. 5
1. National Academy of Sciences, A Framework for Assessing Effects of the Food
System
(2015)
[hereinafter
Food
Systems
Framework],
available
at
https://www.nap.edu/read/18846/chapter/1, at 63 (internal citations omitted).
2. Cf. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The Future of Food
and Agriculture: Trends and Challenges [hereinafter The Future of Food and Agriculture]
(2017), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6583e.pdf, at 4 (“Food supply chains have
lengthened dramatically as the physical distance from farm to plate has increased; the
consumption of processed, packaged and prepared foods has increased in all but the most
isolated rural communities.”).
3. Food Systems Framework, supra note 1, at 32.
4. See id. at 32-33.
5. See Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J.
419, 421 (2015) (“Domestic regulations on supply chains pose a unique compliance
challenge to companies because these laws operate extraterritorially.”).
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Moreover, these chains are also often quite complex. 6 As
one study has argued, “[o]wing to the many domains involved
and the different scales on which different processes take place
(from households to the global market), food systems are
inherently highly complex systems: That is, their relevant
aspects cannot be captured from a single perspective, and
therefore different stakeholders may have different perceptions
of what a food system is and how it performs.”7 Such
complexities can involve differing relationships within various
spheres: public, scientific, market, and policy. 8 A “public”
analysis involves various public concerns, such as cultural
considerations and sustainability, about the relationships
between various components of food supply chains. 9 A
“scientific” analysis involves the factual examination of the
production chains themselves. 10 A “market” analysis involves
economic assessments of how differing aspects of food supply
chains are related in terms of pricing and marketing. 11 And a
“policy” analysis involves examinations of how different
components are related through public regulation and policies. 12
As such, any comprehensive attempt to characterize the
interrelationships amongst components of food supply chains
will, by necessity, need to take into account these various
perspectives on how these components can be interrelated.
Finally, global food supply chains are characterized by the
large variety of contractual forms used by private actors to
structure those production chains. 13 These can include the use
forms for “spot markets” (that is, “commodities sold for cash
and delivered immediately”), for marketing contracts (which
often “[c]ontain estimates of the production under the contract
and of delivery times and quantities”), for production contracts
(where producers “agree[] to deliver a product produced in a
6. See Gonzalo Gamboa et al., The Complexity of Food Systems: Defining Relevant
Attributes and Indicators for the Evaluation of Food Supply Chains in Spain, 8
SUSTAINABILITY 515, at 2 (2016).
7. Id. at 2.
8. See id. at 7.
9. Cf. id.
10. Cf. id.
11. See Gamboa et al., supra note 6.
12. Cf. id.
13. See Pavel Vavra, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers No. 16,
Role, Usage and Motivation for Contracting in Agriculture 2 (2009).
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manner set forth in the agreement”) and for governance via
vertical integration (where a single firm “controls assets and
production decisions in adjacent farming and processing
stages.”).14 These different types of contractual forms can
include a number of variations of terms within the forms
themselves, involving different terms for production and sales
standards, liability allocation, and sales timing. 15 And—when
food suppliers are concerned about sustainability or the
appearance of sustainability—these terms can involve setting
specific standards to reach desired sustainability goals.16
These aspects of global supply chains have engendered
distress among food sustainability activists, to the extent that
one scholar has described the global food system as “literally
killing us.”17 Among the concerns raised by activists and
scholars are the impacts that global supply chains have on
sustainability, including the lengthening of the supply chains
and its impact on sustainability, 18 the difficulty of tracking
changes within supply chains and the resulting impact on
sustainability,19 and lack of accountability within private supply
chains.20
Due to these considerations, activists and scholars, as well
as various international organizations concerned about the
sustainability of global food supply chains have focused on
establishing a number of standards for food production. 21
14. See id. at 6.
15. See id. at 5.
16. See id. at 6-7.
17. Molly D. Anderson, Food Ethics Council, Why the Global Food System Is
Literally Killing Us, FOOD ETHICS COUNCIL: BLOG (June 2, 2018), https://
www.foodethicscouncil.org/ blog/ 166/ 19/ why- the- global- food- system- is- literallykilling- us/ [https://perma.cc/D673-RVXB].
18. See, e.g., The Future of Food and Agriculture, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that
“[t]he lengthening of food chains and changes in dietary patterns have further increased the
resource-, energy-, and emission-intensity of the global food system.”)
19. See, e.g., Volker Keiner, How To Create A Transparent, Sustainable Food
Supply Chain, DIGITALIST MAGAZINE (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.digitalistmag.com/
digital-supply-networks/ 2016/ 09/ 13/ create- transparent-sustainable- food- supply- chain04462240 [https://perma.cc/LG4Q-ZJG4] (describing concerns regarding supply chain
traceability).
20. See, e.g., M. Deblonde et al., An Ethical Toolkit for Food Companies:
Reflections on Its Use, 20 J. AGR. & ENVTL. ETHICS 99, 105 (2006) (describing the
importance of accountability in designing ethical supply chains).
21. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development & Food &
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, OECD‑FAO Guidance for Responsible
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Notable is the relatively recent Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) “Guidance for Responsible
Agricultural Supply Chains.”22 This guidance, promulgated in
2016, highlights a number of key aspects for consideration in
building sustainable agricultural supply chains: human rights,
labor rights, health and safety, food security and nutrition, tenure
rights, animal welfare, environmental protection, governance,
and technology and innovation. 23 It focuses on procedural
methods to incorporate these considerations into supply chains
that purport to be sustainable. 24 In particular, it recommends a
few key steps to building sustainable agricultural supply chains:
“[e]stablish[ing] strong enterprise management systems for
responsible agricultural supply chains,” “[i]dentify[ing],
assess[ing] and prioriti[zing] risks in the supply chain,”
“[d]esign[ing] and implement[ing] a strategy to respond to
identified risks,” “[v]erify[ing] supply chain due diligence,” and
“[r]eport[ing] on supply chain due diligence.” 25
Similarly,
the
International
Organization
for
Standardization, a private body that “develop[s] and publish[es]
International Standards,”26 has recently promulgated standards
for sustainable procurement (applicable also to food and
agricultural sectors). 27 This standard, known as ISO 20400,
“aims to assist organisations in meeting their sustainability
responsibilities by providing guidance as to the effective
implementation of sustainable purchasing practices and

Agricultural Supply Chains [hereinafter OECD-FAO Guidance] (2016), http://
mneguidelines.oecd.org/ OECD- FAO- Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W86-Q96C];
International Organization for Standardization, ISO 20400, Sustainable Procurement
[hereinafter ISO 20400: Sustainable Procurement] (2017); Miet Maertens & Johan
Swinnen, Agricultural Trade and Development: A Value Chain Perspective, WTO
Working Paper ERSD-2015-04 (April 2015), available at [https://perma.cc/MUP6-E5NQ],
at 8 (describing the increasing use of private standards).
22. OECD-FAO Guidance, supra note 21, at 13-23.
23. Id. at 26-29.
24. See, e.g., id. at 31-33 (describing good assessment procedure practices, as well as
standard-setting processes and risk assessment and management processes).
25. Id. at 31-38.
26. International Organization for Standardization, International Organization for
Standardization, https:// www.iso.org/ home. html [https://perma.cc/ZUM9-GMGB].
27. See ISO 20400: Sustainable Procurement, supra note 21.
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policies.”28 This private standard focuses on explaining the
fundamentals of “sustainability,” and emphasizes the importance
of incorporating standards for sustainability within supply
chains.29 It also contains suggestions for management strategies
and performance metrics that incorporate sustainability
concerns.30
Indeed, such standard-setting approaches have been
adopted by a number of global actors. McDonalds, for example,
has adopted what it called their “Global Sustainability
Framework,” which established “aspirational goals [for 2020]
across a series of social and environmental topics in pillars
[they] called Food, Planet and Sourcing.” 31 Similarly, Unilever
adopted a “Sustainable Living Plan,” with environmental goals
that included halving “the greenhouse gas (GHG) impact of our
products across the lifecycle by 2030,” halving “the water
associated with the consumer use of [their] products by 2020,”
halving “the waste associated with the disposal of [their]
products by 2020,” and sourcing “100% of [their] agricultural
raw materials sustainably” by 2020. 32
Such efforts, however, can raise concerns of
“greenwashing,” a term used “to describe the deceptive use of
‘green marketing’ to promote a misleading perception that a
company’s policies, practices, products or services are
environmentally friendly.” 33 Without sufficient monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms for these sustainability initiatives,
observers may have a difficult time assessing the actual effects
of these initiatives on the environment. 34
28. Holding Redlich, A New Standard in Procurement—A Closer Look at ISO
20400, LEXOLOGY (July 2017), https:// www.lexology.com/ library/ detail. aspx?g=
6a2c4a73- 4afc- 497a- 9a4f- b1aa8d2b7625 [https://perma.cc/7QDT-8AEP].
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. McDonalds, Using Our Scale for Good, http:// corporate. mcdonalds.com/
corpmcd/ scale- for- good/ using- our- scale- for-good.html [https://perma.cc/6DR3RV9Y].
32. Unilever, Sustainable Living: Water Use, https://www.unilever.com/sustainableliving/reducing-environmental-impact/water-use// [https://perma.cc/7XMP-4MZ2].
33. Devika Kewalramani & Richard J. Sobelsohn, Are You Being Greenwashed?, 84
N.Y. ST. B.J. 5 (June 2012).
34. See, e.g., Sarfaty, supra note 5 at 426-27 (describing “existing voluntary
standards (e.g., OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ILO’s Tripartite
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, and UN
Global Compact) and self-regulation (e.g., codes of conduct) have been largely ineffective
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As such, these types of general standards may be
insufficient to fully reach goals of sustainability through private
governance.
This is because the incorporation of such
standards, while admirable, often fail to fully address the various
supply chain features described earlier in this essay. That is, the
multiplicity of chain components, the complexity of supply
chain interrelationships, and the diversity of private enforcement
mechanisms can often mean that any failure to fully comply
with adopted “sustainability standards” can be either overlooked
or even impossible to ascertain. 35 Instead, I argue that insights
from the systems analysis literature might provide useful tools
for better addressing these general concerns.

II. AN INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
From a legal perspective, what is involved in a systems
analysis approach to food chain sustainability? To address this
question, I draw from the approach of Donella Meadows, a
pioneering environmental systems scholar. 36 In her work,
Thinking in Systems, she described a number of ways to think
about environmental considerations from a systems analysis
perspective.37 Using a systems analysis approach, Meadows
pointed out that any system is comprised of three parts: its
elements, its interconnectivities, and its function. 38 Each of
these—the elements, relationships, and their various functions –
are important in terms of understanding how a particular system
(such as the global food supply chain system) works.
in shaping corporate behavior as they lack independent monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms and are thus subject to critiques of greenwashing.”); see also William S.
Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing. 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253-61
(2003).
35. Cf. Jerry Davis, Can Global Supply Chains Be Accountable?, YALE GLOBAL
ONLINE (May 2013), https:// yaleglobal.yale.edu/ content/ can- global- supply- chains- beaccountable[https://perma.cc/P27X-BGT4] (describing the difficulty that consumers have
in holding supply chains accountable for their actual production processes).
36. See The Donella Meadows Project, About Donella “Dana” Meadows, http://
donellameadows.org/ donella- meadows- legacy/ donella- dana- meadows/
[https://perma.cc/KV7C-PRMX] (describing her as “one of the most influential
environmental thinkers of the twentieth century”); see also Wolfgang Sexon, Donella
Meadows, 59, Author, And Advocate for Environment, NY TIMES (Feb. 22, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/22/us/donella-meadows-59-author-and-advocate-forenvironment.html.
37. See generally DONELLA MEADOWS, THINKING IN SYSTEMS (2008).
38. Id. at 11.
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Nevertheless, this systems-based approach emphasizes
interconnectivities and functions as more relevant towards
deriving avenues for potential change than any sole focus on the
elements of the system, which is the focus of many standardsetting initiatives.39
In turn, the systems analysis approach also focuses on
systematic aspects rarely used in legal analysis, concepts such as
stocks (which constitute elements of the system that can be
measured or seen at any given time), 40 flows (the actions which
change the stocks over time), 41 dynamics (the behavior of stocks
and flows over time), 42 and dynamic equilibria (equilibrium
states that are reached through the dynamics of a system). 43
This kind of approach also introduces concepts such as feedback
loops (mechanisms that—through the interaction of stocks and
flows—lead to consistent behavior patterns over a long period of
time),44 shifting dominance (changes in the impact of one
feedback loop over others, when multiple feedback loops are
present),45 resilience (a system’s ability to persist within a
changing environment), 46 and limiting factors (necessary inputs
to systems that limit the activities of the system at particular
moments).47 Again, these are the sorts of aspects that—as I’ve
highlighted—are not emphasized in the standard-setting
approaches developed recently in the food chain sustainability
context.48
In short, a systems analysis approach indicates that
advocates who want to fully engage with structural issues should
focus more on how components within a system—such as the
global food supply chain system—operate and respond to
change, rather than only focusing on standards for particular
outputs or components. This, in turn, can suggest that fruitful
avenues for advocacy can involve not only the setting of
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 14-17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18-19.
MEADOWS, supra note 37, at 19-20.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 25-27.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 76-78.
MEADOWS, supra note 37, at 100-03.
See Redlich, supra note 28.
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standards for sustainable food chain management, but the
strengthening of points within the system whereby advocates
can have continuing effect.
This is where the systems analysis concept of leverage
points is especially fertile. 49 In systems analysis, “leverage
points” are points within complex systems “where a small shift
in one thing can produce big changes in everything.”50 While
there are no easy methods for identifying leverage points
without inquiring into the particularities of individual systems, 51
systems scholars have at least developed principles for
identifying the types of leverage points that are more effective at
achieving change. 52 Given this context, a systems approach to
enhancing global food supply chain sustainability would
emphasize not only the stocks and flows of the supply chains—
the focus of many standard-setting initiatives—but also
incorporating leverage points whereby activists can continue to
shift supply chains towards greater sustainability.

III. IDENTIFYING KEY LEVERAGE POINTS WITHIN
GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS USING THE
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPROACH
So, if sustainability advocates are to embrace the insights
that systems analysis thinking provides regarding leverage
points, upon what sorts of private governance mechanisms
should advocates focus? This Part provides a few suggestions,
using various case studies, mostly from the fair labor arena, to
illustrate how the incorporation of certain supply chain
governance mechanisms can be used by sustainability activists
to leverage the promotion of sustainability. In particular, this
Part emphasizes traceability, transparency, third-party
enforceability, and adaptability mechanisms as leverage points
that warrant further study and potential advocacy. In discussing
the case studies, this essay also examines how these leverage
points often work in synergy with each other, and thus, how

49. See DONELLA MEADOWS, Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System
(1999), available at [https://perma.cc/XB96-8Q3Z].
50. Id. at 1.
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id. at 3.

474

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:2

adoption of any single leverage point alone may be insufficient
to shift supply chains towards greater sustainability.
Traceability in supply chains constitutes the ability of
actors to track the overall supply chain components. 53 A
number of definitions for traceability exist, 54 but the idea of
traceability is the ability to follow the movement of food
through its various stages of production, processing, and
distribution.55 Traceability can provide both informational
benefits, by way of systematically tracking the sources and
movement of components of supply chains, as well as
accountability benefits, if such tracking information is made
publicly available. 56 With respect to incorporating sustainability
into supply chains, implementing traceability mechanisms can
allow producers to identify unsustainable links within supply
chains, and also address any concerns that may arise if new
reports shed light on the unsustainable practices of certain
suppliers. This is an especially important leverage point from
the global food supply chain perspective, given the
characteristics of the diversity of components and structural
complexity described earlier. 57 Without the incorporation of
traceability mechanisms, sustainability advocates will face
significant hurdles in assessing the sustainability performance of
many supply chains.
One example of a traceability initiative is the International
Tin Supply Chain Initiative, a program that assists companies
with due diligence and the responsible sourcing of minerals
from high-risk areas.58 The Initiative is implemented through

53. See, e.g., Pam Ly, Targeting the Conflict Minerals Trade: Corporate Social
Responsibility Governance and the Multilateral System, 25 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. &
DISP. RESOL. 25, 38-40 (2017) (describing traceability mechanisms for conflict minerals
chains); Andrea Migone & Michael Howlett, From Paper Trails to DNA Barcodes:
Enhancing Traceability in Forest and Fishery Certification, 52 NAT. R ESOURCES J. 421
(2012) (describing traceability mechanisms in forest and fisheries product chains).
54. See Migone & Howlett, supra note 53, at 424 n.14.
55. See, e.g., Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1 (EC); Codex
Alimentarius Commission (defining traceability as “the ability to follow the movement of a
food through specified stage(s) of production, processing and distribution.”).
56. Myo Min Aung & Yoon Seok Chang, Traceability in a Food Supply Chain:
Safety and Quality Perspectives, 39 FOOD. CONTROL J. 173, 173 (2014).
57. Id.
58. International Tin Supply Chain Initiative, The ITSCI Programme for Responsible
Mineral Supply Chains, https://www.itsci.org/ [https://perma.cc/YD6L-6YWG].
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the collaboration of governmental authorities, companies and
civil society organizations. 59 One of its key features is the
implementation of traceability mechanisms. As described by the
Initiative itself,
Once a mine is identified and approved, traceability is
implemented by the relevant government agents. ITSCI
issues tags to those government agents for use at the
approved sites, and the agents record relevant data
associated with each bag of mineral as the tags are applied.
The agents are regularly on site and are responsible for
assuring the source of minerals tagged. Similar data
recording takes place at processor and exporter locations
and all data is transmitted, either by internet or phone
network to the ITSCI data centre where it is verified and
checked for errors and anomalies. ITSCI field teams
support the government by training agents and following up
on any potential issues of fraud or other challenges. 60

This Initiative has won a number of awards for spurring
and improving the use of traceability mechanisms for tin-based
supply chains. 61 Concerns, however, have been raised regarding
the limited focus of the Initiative (to tin), and the lack of thirdparty audits to verify “conflict-free” claims.62 Nevertheless, the
Initiative has been praised for “facilitat[ing] compliance with
[some disclosure provisions of the Dodd Frank Act.]”63
Public transparency in supply chains can also provide a
useful leverage point for sustainability advocates. Transparency
can include providing public access to sourcing data, third-party
audit information, or even annual assessments of sustainability
59. International Tin Supply Chain Initiative, Purpose, https:// www.itsci.org/
purpose/ [https://perma.cc/J9US-KP58].
60. International Tin Supply Chain Initiative, About, https://www.itsci.org/aboutitsci/ [https://perma.cc/E5RS-NY6P].
61. One of the most recent awards was from edie, a UK-based site for environmental
science and management news. See, e.g., ITRI wins edie Sustainable Supply Chains
Leader 2017 (Jan. 27, 2017), https:// www.itsci.org/ 2017/ 01/ 27/ itri- wins- ediesustainable- supply- chains- leader- 2017/ [https://perma.cc/62RX-6NBX].
62. See, e.g., Melissa Pistilli, Conflict Minerals: ITRI Supply Chain Initiative Fails
to Address Major Issues, TANTALUM INVESTING NEWS (Apr. 2010),
https://investingnews.com/ daily/ resource-investing/ critical- metals-investing/ tantaluminvesting/ conflict- minerals- itri- supply- chain- initiative- fails- to- address- major- issues/
[https://perma.cc/Z56W-X3JA].
63. See Ly, supra note 53, at 447.
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metrics within a supply chain. 64
Without transparency
mechanisms, it can be difficult to hold corporate actors
accountable for unsustainable production methods, even if there
is public demand to do so. 65 Even traceability initiatives, such
as that of the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative, may not
successfully address sustainability concerns if that information
is not made publicly available to stakeholders who wish to hold
corporate actors accountable for enhancing sustainability. 66
Again, given the diversity of components and complexity of
supply chains, transparency is necessary for advocates to
leverage sustainable changes within global food supply chains.
At this point, I should also add a cautionary note: I do not
suggest that transparency provisions alone are sufficient for
advocates to leverage greater sustainability out of global supply
chains. As a number of scholars have observed, the information
provided through various transparency and disclosure
mechanisms is often hard for consumers and investors to follow;
moreover, advocates are not necessarily able to launch effective
boycotts of suppliers who disclose negative information. 67
64. See, e.g., Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Casting a Wide Net to Catch the Big Fish: A
Comprehensive Initiative to Reduce Human Trafficking in the Global Seafood Chain, 17 U.
PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 221, 244, 251, 254 (2014).
65. See id. at 221 (“With no clear-cut international or national enforcement
mechanisms to monitor the integrity of supply chains, little risk of punishment, diminishing
courses of action in court, and a fragmented consumer base to hold corporations
accountable, corporations have little incentive to maintain transparency in their supply
chains.”); Sophia Eckert, The Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act:
Fighting Forced Labor in Complex Global Supply Chains, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 383, 383
(2013) (“Global corporate supply chains have become increasingly complex networks that
provide little to no transparency. This lack of transparency poses a very real challenge to
uncovering forced labor in market activities.”)
66. See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain
Disclosure Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2017).
67. See id. at’ 5-6 (“[H]uman rights-related supply chain disclosures are likely to be
uniquely difficult to interpret because they do not provide information on the actual
number of human rights abuses a company has committed. They instead only provide
information on the level of due diligence companies conduct to minimize the risk of human
rights violations in their supply chains. Finally, it is difficult for consumers and experts
alike to assess the probability of human rights abuse in a given company’s supply chain
because the levels of risk vary considerably based on a company’s size, industry, the
country in which it operates, the number of tiers of suppliers in its supply chain, and the
total number of suppliers. Taken together, these features of supply chain disclosures make
them likely to be even less effective than disclosures in other contexts.”); Marcia Narine,
Disclosing Disclosure’s Defects: Addressing Corporate Irresponsibility for Human Rights
Impacts, 47 COLUM. HUM. R TS. L. REV. 84, 84-85 (2015) (“However, evidence shows that
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Instead, I argue for advocates to press for supplier adoption of
transparency mechanisms in conjunction with the other leverage
points discussed in this essay. That is, while transparency
mechanisms alone may not provide sufficient leverage for
sustainability (due to the other considerations discussed by
observers) they are nevertheless critical for use with other
leverage points.
One example of a corporate initiative is the Nike
Transparency Initiative. 68 Using both interactive maps and other
reporting, Nike has disclosed more than 220 reports available on
factory inspections conducted by third parties. 69 While critiques
have still been raised regarding Nike’s substantive labor
practices, Nike—due to this initiative—has nevertheless been
praised as “com[ing] a long way.” 70
The incorporation of third-party participation mechanisms
within global supply chains is the final potential leverage point
that this essay argues should be the focus of sustainability
advocates. As observers have demonstrated, neither traceability
nor transparency alone—although moderately successful at
advancing sustainability goals— have fully addressed fair labor
concerns within supply chains, and there is no reason to suspect
that the context of sustainability would be any different. 71
One major success in this area has been the Coalition of
Immokalee ’Workers’ Fair Food Program, 72 deemed the “best

disclosures generally fail to change behavior because: (1) there are too many of them; (2)
stakeholders suffer from disclosure overload; and (3) not enough consumers or investors
penalize companies by boycotting products or divesting.”).
68.
Nike,
Nike
Aims
to
Transform
Manufacturing,
https://about.nike.com/pages/transform-manufacturing
[https://perma.cc/9B62-2KS7]
(“The Nike Manufacturing Map discloses the names, locations and demographic
information about the workforce at the factories we contract to make our product, and
holds us accountable for our chosen source base.”); see also Nike, Nike Manufacturing
Map, http://manufacturingmap.nikeinc.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZG8T-V4SF] (providing an
interactive map).
69. Fair Labor Association, Nike, Inc., http://www.fairlabor.org/affiliate/nike-inc
(disclosing 221 third party inspection reports on Nike factories around the world).
70. See Simon Birch, How Activism Forced Nike to Change Its Ethical Game, THE
GUARDIAN (July 6, 2012), https:// www.theguardian.com/ environment/ green- livingblog/ 2012/ jul/ 06/activism-nike [https://perma.cc/L8BY-PYUM].
71. Adam S. Chilton & Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain Disclosure
Regimes, 53 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 20-22 (2017).
72. See generally Fair Food Program, About the Fair Food Program,
http://www.fairfoodprogram.org/ [https://perma.cc/3MGZ-RURT].
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workplace-monitoring program” by the New York Times. 73
This Program was initiated in 2011 by the Coalition of
Immokalee Workers, a grassroots farmworker organization, to
address labor abuses in the tomato grower industry. 74 The Fair
Food Program works through a Code of Conduct that must be
adopted by members of the program.75 Notably, the Code of
Conduct does not merely include the adoption of fair labor
standards (such as zero tolerance for forced labor and assault),
but also the requirement that employers under the Fair Food
Program both (1) create “worker-triggered complaint resolution
mechanism[s] leading to complaint investigation[s], corrective
action plans, and, if necessary, suspension of a farm’s
Participating Grower status, and thereby its ability to sell to
Participating Buyers,” and (2) allow “[o]ngoing auditing of the
farms by the Fair Food Standards Council to insure compliance
with each element of the program.” 76
The worker-driven, participatory aspects of this program
have been praised by many scholars.77 In particular, scholars
observe that
73. Steven Greenhouse, In Florida Tomato Fields, a Penny Buys Progress, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014).
74. Greg Asbed & Steve Hitov, Preventing Forced Labor in Corporate Supply
Chains: The Fair Food Program and Worker-Driven Social Responsibility, 52 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 497, 498 (2017).
75. Fair Food Standards Council, Fair Food Code of Conduct, http://
www.fairfoodstandards.org/
resources/
fairfoodcodeofconduct/
[https://perma.cc/NR6P-AWWK].
76. Fair Food Standards Council, Frequently Asked Questions, http:// www.
fairfoodstandards.org/ resources/ frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/BXX8DXVV]; see also Fair Foods Standards Council, Fair Food Code of Conduct, supra note
75, Part I.15 (“Each Participating Grower will inform Qualifying Workers of their right to
use the complaint resolution process operated by the FFSC, and may also establish a
complaint resolution process of its own that is acceptable to the FFSC. Participating
Growers will not attempt to impede in any way the investigation of a complaint by the
FFSC on behalf of a Qualifying Worker, and will not engage in or permit retribution or
retaliation of any kind against a Qualifying Worker for seeking to file or having filed a
complaint.”).
77. See, e.g., Asbed & Hitov, supra note 74, at 521-24 (highlighting the complaints
mechanism of the Fair Food Program); Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate
Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 809-15 (2014) (praising the shift from “unilateral”
to “bilateral” (meaning stakeholder inclusiveness) strategies for corporate social
responsibility); Greg Asbed & Sean Sellers, The Fair Food Program: Comprehensive,
Verifiable and Sustainable Change For Farmworkers, 16 U. P A. J. L. & S OC. CHANGE 39,
46 (2013) (“When workers encounter a potential Code violation, the FFP provides them
access, protected access, with strict consequences for retaliation—to a fast, effective and
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“[m]any buyers concentrate on setting standards (through
corporate codes) and monitoring (through audits) but do not
provide local managers with the support to implement the
necessary changes. The weakness of audits is that they
measure non-compliance but they generally fail to provide
local management with the tools to make the necessary
improvements. . . . The way to correct these incentives is to
adopt an alternative model for corporate social
responsibility that rejects a unilateral, buyer-driven, topdown approach in favor of a partnership model for
improving CSR in the value chain. 78

In conjunction with traceability and transparency
mechanisms, the incorporation of third party participation
mechanisms can create a critical leverage point for sustainability
advocates.79 These mechanisms need not take the complaintsdriven approach used in the Fair Food Program. 80 Rather, such
participation mechanisms can take the form of contractually
required opportunities for third-party monitoring, a regular
requirement for third-party consultation in the development of
standards and corporate governance policies, or even the express
incorporation
of third-party beneficiary enforcement
mechanisms within supply chain contracts themselves. 81 Given
the large variety of contractual forms used in global supply
chain sourcing contracts outlined earlier (leading to oftenobscured standard-setting through those contracts), such general
third party participation opportunities can provide critical
leverage points for advocates to exert pressure on supply chains
to reach goals of sustainability. 82

IV. CONCLUSION
proven complaint process. The complaint procedure is essential to managing risks before
they become bigger problems, and the growers who have truly embraced the Fair Food
Program understand the benefit of this.”).
78. Parella, supra note 77, at 808-09.
79. JASON POTTS, MATTHEW LYNCH, ANN WILKINGS, GABRIEL H UPPE, MAXINE
CUNNINGHAM & VIVEK VOORA, THE S TATE OF SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVES REVIEW
2014, 27, 52, 164, 181, 325 (2014).
80. Fair Food Program 2014 Annual Report, Fair Food Standard Council (2014).
81. Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human
Rights Risks Into State—Investor Contract Negotiations, United Nations, 28, 33-34. ’’
82. Id. at 1, 28, 33-34.
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This essay intended to provide a sketch of how
sustainability advocates can use structural changes, rather than
standard-setting, to incorporate leverage points into supply chain
governance. This is not to suggest that any struggle to
encourage suppliers to adopt such leverage points will be easy;
after all, such measures will open suppliers to additional
scrutiny, which may be considered undesirable. However, the
case studies I’ve described suggest that the incorporation of
leverage points can be achievable in practice.
Future legal work is still necessary, however, to build
model contractual language to better incorporate such structures
into supply chain policies and purchasing agreements; grassroots
advocates may not have the resources and capacities to do that
alone. And again, because of the variety of contractual forms
that govern global food supply chains, a modular approach to
developing such model terms may be warranted. This essay
ends with a call for legal scholars interested in supply chain
sustainability to devote greater attention to developing such
provisions, and thereby, enhancing the ability of advocates to
provide concrete suggestions in their advocacy efforts.

